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I.

INTRODUCTION

ERISA1 is a federal statute that regulates employee benefits such as pensions,
401(k) plans, health care, and disability—collectively some of the most important
property and contract rights that working Americans have. Passed in 1974,2
ERISA preempts state law3 and imposes fiduciary duties on those who administer
* Associate Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
1. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006). This Article
generally cites to ERISA but provides parallel citations to the United States Code.
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461.
3. ERISA generally preempts any state law that “relate[s] to” an employee benefit plan. ERISA §
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employee benefits.4 ERISA fiduciary duties largely track the duties of a trustee. So,
ERISA requires employers to set aside funds in trust to pay pension benefits
(including those offered under 401(k) plans). Employers need not, however, set
aside funds to pay non-pension benefits (called welfare benefits), but may do so if
they wish or to satisfy the demands of a labor union. The legal entity that pays
ERISA-covered benefits is the “plan,” and any associated funds are “plan assets.”
An ERISA fiduciary who harms or abuses plan assets (e.g., by negligent
investing) must make the plan whole by paying either damages or restitution.5
Trust beneficiaries may seek similar redress for breach of trust. Yet, unlike trust
law, ERISA imposes fiduciary duties extending beyond the management and
distribution of property. ERISA fiduciaries have discretion to pay or deny claims
for benefits, and a wrongful denial of benefits can devastate an employee and her
covered dependents. In Corcoran v. United Healthcare Inc.,6 Florence Corcoran was
suffering through a difficult pregnancy and asked her ERISA-covered health plan
to pay for hospitalization, which her doctor had recommended. The reviewing
fiduciary (United Healthcare) denied the claim, determining hospitalization to be
medically unnecessary despite her doctor’s recommendation. About two weeks
later, Mrs. Corcoran’s fetus went into distress and died.7 Mrs. Corcoran sued
United Healthcare, but the Fifth Circuit—in interpreting Supreme Court precedent
at the time—denied her any ERISA remedy.8
Later Supreme Court cases confirm the result of Corcoran.9 Fiduciary
breaches that harm plan assets warrant full relief. Breaches that do not harm plan
assets warrant only “appropriate equitable relief,” which excludes most forms of
monetary relief according to the Court.10 Most commentators, the Department of
Labor, and several judges and justices would grant money damages to plaintiffs
like Mrs. Corcoran.11 These reformers note that Congress based ERISA on trust
law and argue that the Court should conform ERISA remedies with trust remedies,
which aim to “make whole” beneficiaries who are harmed by fiduciary breach.12

514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). ERISA allows states to regulate insurance companies even if they
insure ERISA-governed benefits. Id. § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
4. Id. § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
5. Id. § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
6. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992); cf. Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the
Grand Irony of ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 155 (2009) (“As far as wrongful denial of benefits claim
scenarios, few are better known than [Corcoran].”).
7. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1324.
8. Id. at 1328, 1332–34.
9. See infra Parts III.C and III.D for a discussion of cases confirming the result of Corcoran.
10. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255–58 (1993) (noting that equitable relief
traditionally precludes monetary damages); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 151 n.3 (1985)
(noting statute does not provide for extracontractual damages).
11. Susan Harthill, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Whether Traditional Trust Law “Make-Whole”
Relief Is Available Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 61 OKLA. L. REV. 721, 723–25 (2008); see also Colleen E.
Medill, Resolving the Judicial Paradox of “Equitable” Relief Under ERISA Section 502(A)(3), 39 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 827, 848–50 (2006).
12. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., No. 07-841
(U.S. May 23, 2008), 2008 WL 2185730 (arguing that breaching ERISA fiduciaries should be treated
analogously to breaching trust fiduciaries).
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But this make-whole argument ignores the central role of property in trust
law. The Restatement and treatises all define a trust as “a fiduciary relationship
with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to the property
is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another
person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it.”13
Trustees breach this “fiduciary relationship with respect to property” when they
harm or misappropriate trust property, and the make-whole principle redresses
such property-based breaches. Trust law does not routinely redress harm that is
personal to the beneficiary with damages.14
Health and other welfare plans often hold no assets and comprise promises
to pay benefits. They impose “merely personal duties” upon the employer (or
other administrator of the plan), precluding the application of trust law.15
Nevertheless, the courts roughly follow the remedial system of trust in ERISA
cases, redressing breaches that involve plan assets but denying relief to
employees for their personal harm. Trust law, rather than being the solution to
ERISA remedies, is part of the problem.
The other part of the problem is the Supreme Court’s inconsistency in
interpreting ERISA. The Supreme Court has consistently narrowed ERISA
remedies, but has used inconsistent methods of statutory interpretation to do so.
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance v. Russell,16 the Court found that section
409(a) does not redress a fiduciary breach causing personal harm.17 Even though
the text of section 409(a) would support granting “equitable or remedial relief” for
any breach, the Court found that the overall purpose and context of the statute
protected only plan assets and the plan itself.18 Yet, in Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates19 and Great-West Life and Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,20 the Court
analyzed section 502(a)(3) textually, concluding that its narrower grant of
“equitable relief” must mean something less than all relief.21 Based on historical
equity practice, the Court held that section 502(a)(3) does not offer the remedies
of damages or even legal (as opposed to equitable) restitution.
Those who would reform ERISA remedies focus their attention on Mertens,
Great-West, and the need to incorporate the “make-whole doctrine” of trust law

13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959); accord 1 AMY MORRIS HESS, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT
& GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 (3d ed. 2007), available at Westlaw
BOGERT [hereinafter BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES]. But cf. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of
the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 671 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein, Contractarian Basis] (arguing that
trust law operates more like contract than property law).
14. See infra Part IV.D for a discussion of how make-whole relief redresses property-based
breaches in trust law.
15. See infra notes 223–24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the definition of a trust and
how it requires more than the imposition of merely personal duties.
16. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
17. Russell, 473 U.S. at 144.
18. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the Russell Court’s analysis.
19. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
20. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
21. See infra Parts III.C and III.D for a discussion of Mertens and Great-West and the Court’s narrow
reading of “equitable relief” therein.
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into section 502(a)(3).22 The make-whole theorists, though, overlook the limits of
trust remedies and the textual barriers to interpreting the “equitable relief” of
section 502(a)(3) broadly. The superior way of expanding ERISA remedies is
through the broader grant of “equitable or remedial relief” under section 409(a).
Unlike section 502(a)(3), section 409(a) is directed expressly at fiduciary
breaches and avoids the trap of historical equity practice. By broadening section
409(a), the Supreme Court would point ERISA’s remedies away from the law of
trusts and towards the text of the statute.
II.
A.

ERISA FIDUCIARY STANDARDS

The ERISA Fiduciary Relationship

To be a fiduciary is to be in a relationship with another. A trust, for example,
is “a fiduciary relationship with respect to property” joining trustee and
beneficiary and arising from the intent of the settlor.23 The trustee holds a formal
office subject to onerous duties and heavy sanctions for breach. Reflecting the
burdens of the office, trust law requires consent by the trustee.24
ERISA creates a fiduciary relationship with respect to any “employee benefit
plan” or simply “plan,” which provides either “pension” or “welfare” benefits.25
Pension plans—including 401(k) plans—provide retirement income 26 to
employees and must be funded by the employer.27 Because it is funded, a pension
plan is a “fiduciary relationship with respect to property”—just like a trust.
Welfare plans provide health care, disability benefits, severance, and life
insurance to employees.28 Administering welfare plans (e.g., reviewing employees’
claims for benefits) is a fiduciary function.29 While welfare plans may be “fiduciary
relationships,” the relationship is often not one “with respect to property” because
benefits are paid directly from the employer’s general assets rather than a

22. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error
in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003) [hereinafter Langbein, Trail of
Error].
23. See supra note 13 and accompanying text for the Restatement (Second) of Trusts’ definition of
a trust.
24. See BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 13, § 150 (“The cases fully sustain the position
that a person named as trustee in a deed or will always has the election of accepting the trust or
rejecting it and statutes often give the power to disclaim or decline the trusteeship. No one can be
compelled to undertake the burdens of trusteeship against his desire.” (footnotes omitted)).
25. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006).
26. Id. § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2).
27. Pension plans come in two categories: defined contribution and defined benefit. Defined
contribution plans are “based solely upon the amount contributed to the [employee’s] account,” along
with any associated income, expenses, gains, and losses. Id. §§ 3(34)–(35), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(34)–(35);
see also id. § 3(23)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(B) (defining accrued benefit of DC plan as “the balance of the
individual’s account”). Defined plans must pay benefits “in the form of an annual benefit commencing at
normal retirement age.” Id. § 3(23)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(A). ERISA requires employers to fund
defined-benefit plans. See Id. §§ 301–07, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081–85.
28. Id. § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
29. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 218–19 (2004).
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segregated trust fund.30 Nevertheless, ERISA treats all ERISA plans, whether or
not funded, as trusts and impose fiduciary duties on those who administer them.31
ERISA provides for formal fiduciary offices—including that of trustee—but
extends its fiduciary reach broadly.32 The possession or exercise of discretionary
authority or control over a plan is sufficient to make one a “fiduciary with respect
to a plan.”33 Formal consent is not necessary for ERISA fiduciary status, which
triggers the fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence.
B.

Duty of Loyalty (a.k.a. the Exclusive Benefit Rule)

ERISA was enacted primarily to reform defined-benefit pension plans,
although it covers all employee benefit plans.34 Prior to ERISA’s passage, legions of
disappointed workers would write government officials to complain that they
were denied pension benefits for failing to meet decades-long vesting schedules.35
A plan might have required twenty years of service with an employer before
vesting, and an employee who left after nineteen years would leave without any
pension at all. Workers who had vested in their pension benefits could still lose
out if their pension plan failed and terminated without enough assets to pay
everyone.36
ERISA responded to these scandals by mandating vesting according to a fixed
schedule,37 mandating minimum funding of ongoing plans,38 and partially insuring
benefit payments from failed plans.39 ERISA also created an administrative
framework that completely federalized the rights and remedies with respect to
benefit plans.40 Most importantly for this Article, ERISA imposed mandatory

30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2. See supra note 13 and accompanying text for the
definition of a trust.
31. See Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer’s Shield: The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary
Law, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 395 (2000) (explaining that ERISA treats any individual with discretion
over assets, administration, or management of benefit plan—or is paid to give investment advice to
benefit plan—as a fiduciary).
32. Id.
33. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
34. See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL
HISTORY 4–5 (2004) (describing pre-ERISA pension plan environment and need for pension plan
reform).
35. See Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, in U.S. Sen. Special Comm. on Aging,
98th Cong., The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: The First Decade 16 (1984),
substantially reprinted in JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 67–78 (4th ed. 2006)
(finding that numerous personal letters sent to government offices confirmed that workers were denied
pension benefits despite many years on the job).
36. See generally James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683 (2001) (describing
infamous Studebaker plant shutdown in Indiana, where pension plan lacked sufficient assets to meet all
obligations).
37. ERISA §§ 201–08, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051–58.
38. Id. §§ 301–05, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081–85.
39. Id. §§ 4000–4402, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1461.
40. See id. §§ 501–14, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131–44 (creating criminal and civil penalties and establishing
claims procedures, investigatory rights, and other administrative guidelines for enforcement of ERISA).
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fiduciary duties on all who held discretion over plans. 41 ERISA did not invent the
idea of holding benefit-plan assets in trust, a practice employers performed
voluntarily in the late-nineteenth century and codified in federal tax and labor
laws in the early to mid-twentieth century.42 Nevertheless, it federalized and
mandated a trust model for all employee benefit plans.
The duty of loyalty is “[p]erhaps the most fundamental duty of a trustee,”43
and preeminent in the trust-law duty of loyalty is the prohibition against selfdealing.44 The fiduciary provisions were prompted in part by the looting of
pension funds, particularly by union officials, which eroded funds that had been
set aside for the payment of benefits. 45 Pre-ERISA law was not inert in combating
pension looters, who were already subject to federal criminal sanction. Jimmy
Hoffa, famously, was convicted and jailed in 1964 for defrauding the Central States
Teamsters’ pension plan.46 Nevertheless, Congress viewed these controls as
inadequate and imposed heightened fiduciary standards in ERISA.
Even though pension plans were the focus of ERISA, the fiduciary provisions
apply to almost all varieties of plans.47 Would-be Jimmy Hoffas can loot welfare
funds just as well as pension funds.48 What is curious about the fiduciary
standards, though, is that they reach the entire administration of plans, rather
than just the management and distribution of plan assets. 49 For example,
employers typically provide health care and disability benefits by paying the costs
directly or by buying insurance for employees. Despite the historical concern of
misusing plan assets, the fiduciary provisions of ERISA make no exception for
unfunded plans.50
While the loyalty standard makes sense for pension plans, it is virtually
incoherent when applied to unfunded ERISA plans. The cardinal element of the
duty of loyalty is the prohibition on self-dealing. One might plausibly claim that
unfunded plans never involve self-dealing because there are no assets involved.
Or, one might just as plausibly claim that unfunded plans universally implicate
self-dealing because the employer pays the bills directly. 51 The reason for this
41. See id. §§ 401–14 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–14 (establishing fiduciary duties and specific protective
limits, prohibitions, and obligations regarding management and administration of benefit plans).
42. John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 209.
43. BOGERT’S TRUST AND TRUSTEES, supra note 13, § 543.
44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(2) (2007) (prohibiting trustee self-dealing).
45. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 35, at 10–11 (discussing Senate subcommittee’s reaction to
manipulation of pension funds by two New Jersey unions).
46. WOOTEN, supra note 34, at 118.
47. See ERISA § 401(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (outlining types of plans governed by ERISA).
48. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 35, at 119–20 (explaining that general prevention of self-dealing
and mismanagement in multiemployer plans requires subjecting welfare benefit plans to same fiduciary
requirements as pension plans.)
49. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506–07 (1996) (holding that employer, who was also
plan administer, breached fiduciary duty when deliberately misled employees to change benefit plans).
50. See Muir, supra note 31, at 401–04 (suggesting that unfunded plans were not exempted from
ERISA because unfunded and underfunded plans were widespread problems necessitating ERISA’s
enactment).
51. See generally Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105 (1988).

2010]

REDRESSING ALL ERISA FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER § 409(a)

153

incoherence is that, traditionally, fiduciaries are proxies for beneficiaries. A
trustee manages assets on behalf of beneficiaries, and an agent takes action on
behalf of a principal. Beneficiaries or principals need their fiduciary’s expertise,
which can be effectively deployed only by an expansive grant of authority. The
potential for abuse of this authority, however, necessitates the imposition of
fiduciary duties.52 In economic terms, trust law curtails the agency costs inherent
in discretionary power.53
Yet, employees seeking medical coverage, disability benefits, or severance
are not typically seeking expertise from their employer or any other ERISA
“fiduciary.” An employee’s own physician provides expertise on treatment
decisions. Employees simply want money to pay the bills. The employer might
indeed appoint administrators with expertise to handle claims. Fiduciary law is
probably flexible enough to handle ERISA, so long as judges are aware of the
inherent limits of existing doctrine. The history of fiduciary law has seen the
creation of new fiduciary relationships based on analogy. So, for example, the law
came to impose fiduciary duties on corporate directors by analogizing
corporations to prototypes like trusts, agency, or partnerships.54
Nevertheless, analogy to prototypes is useful only at the initial stage of
doctrinal development. Even if corporate directors were initially recognized as
fiduciaries, it did not follow that trust law held all (or even many) answers to
corporate law issues. Perhaps employers should themselves be viewed as lawful
beneficiaries of employee benefit plans along with their employee. Under this
view, employers would be restrained by the duty of impartiality, under which they
may not favor their own beneficial interest over that of their employees.55
C.

Duty of Prudence

ERISA also imports the duty of prudence from trust law, imposing on its
fiduciaries the obligation to act “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims.”56 The classic application of prudence principles is to

52. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 804 (1983) (discussing potential for
abuse arising from delegation of power to fiduciary).
53. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 624–26
(2004) (arguing trust law should minimize agency costs inherent in granting trustee discretionary
authority).
54. See Frankel, supra note 52, at 804–05 (explaining that courts create new fiduciary
relationships by drawing analogies to prototypical fiduciary relationships such as agency, trust, and
bailment). But cf. Sitkoff, supra note 53, at 623 & n.2 (noting historical connection between trust and
corporation).
55. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 51, at 1159–60 (suggesting duty of impartiality should be
imported to pension law).
56. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2006). A traditional trustee is required to
“exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own
property; and if the trustee has or procures his appointment as trustee by representing that he has
greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he is under a duty to exercise such skill.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
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trust investing. ERISA fiduciaries who handle assets must also diversify plan
investments, except for those rare occasions in which doing so is imprudent and
those common occasions when the plan invests in employer securities.57 The
traditional trust-law standard is adequate for policing investments of plan assets.
We simply ask if a reasonable person would invest this way with his or her own
money.
The Supreme Court has interpreted claims decisions as being fiduciary acts.58
In a traditional trust, distribution decisions are regulated by the duty of prudence
and also the duty of impartiality.59 The trustee must balance the interest of
various claimants in the assets she administers. But, the administrator of an
unfunded ERISA plan is not balancing various claims to assets. She is simply
deciding whether to perform on a contract. Again, the employee does not want
fiduciary expertise from the administrator, only the payment of benefits.
Traditional trust law, then, is an imperfect fit for regulating unfunded ERISA
plans. As the Supreme Court recently said, trust-law principles “serve as a guide
under ERISA but do not ‘tell the entire story.’”60 Professor Dana Muir has
contrasted “asset administration” (e.g., investing assets) and “benefit
administration” (e.g., handling claims).61 When Congress enacted the fiduciary
provisions of ERISA, it was focused on pension plans and asset administration and
looked to trust law as a regulatory model.62 Benefit administration is less
important to pension plans because of the dramatically lower level of discretion.
For example, benefits under a defined-benefit pension plan must be “definitely
determinable,”63 thus precluding broad administrative discretion.64 But benefit
administration is hugely important to welfare plans. One court has even held that
payment of welfare benefits can be within the complete discretion of the
employer.65 In the area of benefit administration, the trust model of ERISA is at its
weakest. Not coincidentally, this is the area where ERISA remedies are at their
narrowest.

57. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C); id. § 404(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).
58. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 218–19 (2004).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 174, 232.
60. Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1643 (2010) (quoting Variety Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S.
489, 497 (1996)).
61. Muir, supra note 31, at 399–410 (quoting Varity, 516 U.S. at 497).
62. See id. at 399–404 (discussing Congress’s focus on pension plans and problems with asset
administration, which led to ERISA’s enactment).
63. 26 C.F.R § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (2009).
64. This is not to say that courts deny administrative discretion over pension plans. See, e.g.,
Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1651 (granting discretion to administrator of defined-benefit plan after
administrator initially miscalculated benefits).
65. See Hamilton v. Air Jam., Ltd., 945 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that ERISA does not
forbid employer from making individual benefit determinations on case-by-case basis).
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III. ERISA REMEDIES
A.

Statutory System

By statute, ERISA preempts state law that “relate[s] to” any employee benefit
plan,66 preempting almost any state law claim based on the misconduct of an
ERISA fiduciary. For example, even though ERISA saves state insurance regulation
from preemption,67 the Supreme Court has held that this exception does not allow
employees to seek remedies under state insurance law. 68 According to the Court,
ERISA’s remedial provisions have their own preemptive force, making them the
exclusive means by which beneficiaries can seek redress for fiduciary breach. Just
as ERISA’s statutory remedies preempt state law remedies (even those based on
state insurance law), it also precludes implicit federal remedies.69 If an aggrieved
employee cannot bring a claim under one of ERISA’s express statutory provisions,
she has no remedy at all.
ERISA has three major remedies for employees, found in the first three parts
of section 502(a), which read as follows:
A civil action may be brought—
(1) by a participant or beneficiary—
....
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan,
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify
his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary [of Labor], or by a participant, beneficiary or
fiduciary for appropriate relief under [section 409 of ERISA];
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act
or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief
(i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan.70
The “appropriate relief” of section 409 is as follows:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any
of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by
this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to
such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through
use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such

66. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
67. Id. § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
68. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004) (holding that Texas Health Care
Liability Act claims are completely preempted by ERISA); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57
(1987) (finding state lawsuit asserting improper processing of claim for benefits under ERISA-regulated
plan preempted by federal law).
69. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (holding that ERISA even
precludes extracontractual damages that arise from improper or untimely processing of claims).
70. ERISA § 502(a)(1)–(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)–(3).
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other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate,
including removal of such fiduciary.71
The three remedies just described are the workhorses of ERISA litigation,
although ERISA does grant less important remedies to enforce statutory penalties
and the like.72 Together, they make up what the Supreme Court described as a
“carefully integrated . . . . interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial
scheme, which is . . . part of a ‘comprehensive and reticulated statute.’”73
According to Professor Dobbs, “[j]udicial remedies usually fall in one of four
major categories: (1) Damages remedies, (2) Restitutionary remedies, (3)
Coercive remedies . . . or (4) Declaratory remedies.”74 ERISA clearly grants
declaratory and coercive remedies, as an employee can bring an action “to clarify
his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan” and the court can “enjoin
any act or practice which violates [ERISA] or the terms of the plan.”75 The
provisions also grant the ability to enforce the payment of promised benefits.76
The Supreme Court has struggled, though, in determining what other forms
of damages and restitution ERISA offers.77 The aim of the damages remedy is to
make whole a plaintiff for harm suffered, and the aim of restitution is to prevent
unjust enrichment of a defendant by restoring her wrongful gains to the plaintiff.78
As we will see in the remainder of this Part, ERISA grants full damages and
restitution to redress a fiduciary breach involving plan assets. Fiduciary breaches
that do not involve plan assets, along with other ERISA violations, warrant far
narrower remedies—in essence, equitable restitution but no damages or legal
restitution.
B.

Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell

As previously noted, ERISA section 409(a) imposes personal liability on
fiduciaries that breach their fiduciary duties.79 Conceptually, section 409(a) offers
four classes of remedies: (1) reimbursement of losses to plan assets; (2) payment
of profits made by the fiduciary’s use of plan assets; (3) removal of a breaching
fiduciary; and (4) “other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate.”80

71. Id. § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
72. See id. § 502(a)(4)–(10), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(4)–(10) (listing further remedial options available
to Secretary of Labor).
73. Russell, 473 U.S. at 146 (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359,
361 (1980)).
74. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES §1.1, at 2 (2d ed. 1993).
75. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); id. § 502(a)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(A).
76. Id. § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); id. § 502(a)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(A).
77. For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions determining forms of damages and restitution
available under ERISA, see infra the remainder of Part III.
78. DOBBS, supra note 74, § 3.1.
79. See infra note 71 and accompanying text for a discussion of remedies for breach of fiduciary
duties.
80. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
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The first three remedies largely track the liability that the law of trusts
imposes to redress a breach of trust. Trustees are subject to personal liability for
any harm they cause to, or any illicit benefit they derive from, trust property.81
The third category, fiduciary removal, also has a clear corollary in trust law.82
The fourth category operates as something of catchall for breaching
fiduciaries. It has no obvious analogue in the Restatement of Trusts beyond the
fact that trust remedies are exclusively equitable. 83 The fourth category is also
most famous for being the subject of the Supreme Court’s most important ERISA
decision.
In Massachusetts Mutual Insurance Co. v. Russell,84 an employee, Doris Russell,
began receiving benefits under her employer’s ERISA-governed disability plan in
May 1979. In October 1979, the employer concluded that Doris was not disabled
and stopped paying benefits.85 Using the employer’s internal appeals process,
Doris convinced her employer that she was in fact disabled and began receiving
benefits (including retroactive benefits) in March 1980.86 Doris claimed that the
interruption of benefit payments harmed her, however, by forcing her husband to
cash out his own retirement plans, thereby aggravating the psychological
condition that caused her to become disabled in the first place.87
Doris then sued her employer, claiming it breached its fiduciary duties by
mishandling her disability claim and seeking compensatory and punitive damages
under section 409(a).88 The Supreme Court denied Doris’ claim, construing the
entirety of section 409(a) as providing only plan-level relief. 89
Russell is most remembered for stating that ERISA has no implied causes of
action. According to the Court:
The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in
§502(a) of the statute as finally enacted, however, provide strong
evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that
it simply forgot to incorporate expressly. The assumption of inadvertent
omission is rendered especially suspect upon close consideration of
ERISA’s interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme,
which is in turn part of a “comprehensive and reticulated statute.”90
Despite the Court’s triumphal language, most commentators are dubious of the
draftsmanship that the Court found in ERISA.91 Of the six enforcement provisions,

81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 (1959) (holding trustees personally liable for
breaches of trust).
82. See id. § 199 (allowing for removal of trustee for breaches of trust).
83. See infra notes 263–65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exclusively equitable
nature of trust remedies.
84. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
85. Russell, 473 U.S. at 136.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 137.
88. Id. at 137–39.
89. Id. at 140–42, 148.
90. Id. at 146 (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).
91. See, e.g., George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Extracontractual Damages Mandated for Benefit Claims
Actions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 611, 613 (1994) (discussing “serious threat” to Congress’s apparent purpose of
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only three92 offer any significant relief to employees and their beneficiaries, but
the types of actions that can arise under ERISA are legion. 93 Of these remedial
provisions, Doris brought her claim under only one, ERISA section 409(a);94 she
did not alternatively ask for relief elsewhere (e.g., under section 502(a)(3)).
When suing her employer under section 409(a), Doris was making a fairly
straightforward textual claim. Her employer was a fiduciary who breached its
duties and should be subject to “equitable or remedial relief as the court may
deem appropriate.”95 In short, Doris argued that section 409(a) should be
interpreted so that the black-lined text, appearing below, has no limiting effect on
her claim:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any
of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by
this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to
such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through
use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate,
including removal of such fiduciary.96
In other words, Doris viewed section 409(a) as granting alternate and
independent grounds of relief. It could provide the traditional remedies from trust
law of redressing harming to plan assets and fiduciary removal. 97 In addition and
more broadly, it could authorize additional “equitable or remedial relief” for
fiduciary breaches that have no connection to plan assets or the plan as a whole.
The Court, however, rejected this reading of section 409(a), holding that all
relief under section 409(a) must flow to the plan and not to individual
beneficiaries.98 After citing the voluminous legislative history focusing on
protecting plan assets,99 the Court rejected Doris’ reading of the statute:
This “blue pencil” method of statutory interpretation—omitting all
words not part of the clauses deemed pertinent to the task at hand—
impermissibly ignores the relevant context in which statutory language
subsists. In this case, this mode of interpretation would render
superfluous the preceding clauses providing relief singularly to the plan,
and would slight the language following after the phrase “such other
equitable or remedial relief.” Congress specified that this remedial
phrase includes “removal of such fiduciary”—an example of the kind of
“plan-related” relief provided by the more specific clauses it succeeds. A
providing “the full range of legal and equitable remedies” under ERISA).
92. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the three major remedies
available to employees under ERISA.
93. See, e.g., Medill, supra note 11, at 831 (indicating “variety of possible claims” under ERISA
Section 502(a)(3) makes judicial determination of remedies difficult).
94. Russell, 473 U.S. at 139 n.5.
95. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006).
96. Id.
97. See infra note 266 and accompanying text for the Restatement (Second) of Trusts list of
remedies for breach of trust.
98. Russell, 473 U.S. at 148.
99. Id. at 140 n.8.
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fair contextual reading of the statute makes it abundantly clear that its
draftsmen were primarily concerned with the possible misuse of plan
assets, and with remedies that would protect the entire plan, rather than
with the rights of an individual beneficiary.100
Later, this Article will try to revive Doris’s “blue pencil” method for reading
section 409(a).101 The important point for now, though, is that Doris was the only
person harmed by the breach, and her alleged harm was by the untimely payment
of benefits.102 The Court even suggested that timely payment of plan benefits is
governed not by the fiduciary provisions of ERISA but by the administrative
provisions found in section 503.103
Russell is based on the supposed premise that “there is a stark absence—in
[ERISA] itself and in its legislative history—of any reference to an intention to
authorize the recovery of extracontractual damages,”104 which is the Court’s
curious term for consequential damages. Above, we already saw that ERISA’s
legislative history shows that Congress was primarily concerned about the misuse
of plan assets.105 Preventing the Jimmy Hoffas of the world from looting pension
funds was clearly on the mind of Congress when it enacted the fiduciary
provisions of ERISA.
Keeping with this history, the Court said in Russell that ERISA fiduciary duties
focus on “proper management, administration, and investment of fund assets, the
maintenance of proper records, the disclosure of specified information, and the
avoidance of conflicts of interest.”106 The specific fiduciary duties mentioned in
Russell are the main duties of a traditional trustee, leading Russell implicitly to
follow the trust model of basing remedies on harm to property. 107
Yet, Doris’ claim in Russell was about the hardship she alleged from the
breach of a benefit promise. She had no claim to property, and thus Russell left her
with no remedy beyond specific performance of the benefit promise.
The Russell decision could be read to extend beyond section 409(a) so as to
restrict the entire universe of ERISA remedies. If so, the only remedy an aggrieved
beneficiary could seek is specific performance of benefit promises. Four Justices
were sufficiently disturbed by this suggestion as to write a concurring—yet
critical—opinion of the majority.108 In their view, section 502(a)(3)—which was
not pled in Russell—could serve as the basis for granting a remedy for the
mishandling of benefit claims.109 Later cases would both vindicate and frustrate
the position of the concurring justices. In Varity Corp. v. Howe,110 the Court would
100. Id. at 142 (citation omitted).
101. See infra Part V for a discussion of how the language in section 409(a) can be interpreted to
allow for the redress of all fiduciary breaches.
102. Russell, 473 U.S. at 136–37.
103. Id. at 143–44.
104. Id. at 148.
105. Id. at 142.
106. Id. at 142–43.
107. See infra part IV.D.3 for a discussion of the model of basing remedies on harm to property.
108. Russell, 473 U.S. at 150–51 (Brennan, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 151–55.
110. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
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in fact hold that breaching fiduciaries could be liable to individual beneficiaries
under section 502(a)(3).111 Yet, as discussed later, section 502(a)(3) has been
construed to preclude consequential damages.112 As a result, a remedy does exist
for individual-level harms, but it is limited to coercive relief and equitable
restitution.
Russell expressly sanctioned fiduciary liability for negligently investing
defined-benefit plan assets.113 Yet, until very recently, it was thought that
fiduciaries would not be liable for negligently investing the account of a single
participant in a defined-contribution plan.114 The reason for this theory was dicta
in Russell: that a fiduciary breach must harm the plan as a whole, not a single
participant, before the fiduciary could be subject to damages.115 In LaRue v.
DeWolff, Boberg & Associates,116 the Supreme Court held otherwise, subjecting a
plan fiduciary to liability for negligently investing the account of a single
participant.
C.

Mertens v. Hewitt Associates

The plaintiffs in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates117 were employees who
participated in a pension plan that terminated without enough assets to pay all
benefits due.118 They sued the fiduciaries of the plan, claiming that the failure to
fund the plan adequately was a breach of fiduciary duties. 119 The deep pockets,
though, belonged to the plan’s actuary, Hewitt Associates, a multi-billion dollar
consultancy firm.
As the plan's actuary, Hewitt was not an ERISA fiduciary.120 The plaintiffs,
though, claimed that Hewitt was liable for participating in a fiduciary breach by
not advising the plan sponsor to fund the plan at a higher level.121 Trust law
imposes liability on non-trustees who participate in a fiduciary breach,122
although there were good reasons to think that ERISA would not impose a similar
liability because of the more expansive definition of fiduciaries and the vigorous
regulation of transactions with nonfiduciary parties in interest.123 Moreover, it is

111. Howe, 516 U.S. at 515.
112. See infra Parts III.C and III.D for a discussion of cases where the courts have interpreted
section 502(a)(3) to preclude consequential damages.
113. Russell, 473 U.S. at 139 (finding that section 409 relief must inure to the plan as a whole).
114. See, e.g., Medill, supra note 11, at 848–52 (discussing difficulties individuals face in obtaining
remedies for fiduciary duty breach under current Supreme Court interpretations of ERISA).
115. Russell, 473 U.S. at 140.
116. 552 U.S. 248 (2008).
117. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
118. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 250.
119. Id.
120. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5 (2009) (advising that actuaries will not ordinarily be considered
fiduciaries while performing usual professional functions).
121. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 250–51.
122. BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 13, § 901.
123. Unlike trust law, ERISA does not limit fiduciary duties to the formal office of trustee. Instead,
duties apply to all those with discretion over plan administration. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(21)(A) (2006). Moreover, ERISA has a detailed system of “prohibited transactions” between
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doubtful that the act of funding a plan even falls within the purview of ERISA
fiduciary duties at all. Acts such as “establishing, funding, amending, and
terminating” are considered settlor functions and beyond the bounds of ERISA
fiduciary duties.124 In short, there likely was no breach for Hewitt to have
participated in.
The parties in Mertens, however, focused their efforts on ERISA remedies
rather than substantive duties. Because Hewitt was not a fiduciary, section 409(a)
was not available to the plaintiffs; the only remedy available by statute was for
“appropriate equitable relief” under section 502(a)(3). 125 The Mertens plaintiffs
sought money damages to bring the plan up to full funding, and Hewitt argued
that damages were legal, not equitable, in nature.126 Hewitt won the case because
the Court found that money damages were legal, not equitable, relief.127
The Mertens plaintiffs had a fairly straightforward argument, although less
textual than the plaintiff’s argument in Russell. According to the Mertens plaintiffs,
“ERISA’s roots [are] in the common law of trusts,”128 and the Restatement on
Trusts flatly declares that almost all trust remedies are “exclusively equitable.”129
Historically, trusts were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of equity courts.
These courts had broad authority to fashion remedies and could grant monetary
relief against breaching trustees and third parties who knowingly participated in
breaches.130
This exclusivity, though, was not enough to convince Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, that the relief sought was in fact equitable. Quoting Pomeroy’s
venerable treatise on equity, Justice Scalia said,
At common law, however, there were many situations—not limited to
those involving enforcement of a trust—in which an equity court could
“establish purely legal rights and grant legal remedies which would
otherwise be beyond the scope of its authority.” The term “equitable
relief” can assuredly mean, as petitioners and the Solicitor General
would have it, whatever relief a court of equity is empowered to provide
in the particular case at issue. But as indicated by the foregoing
quotation—which speaks of “legal remedies” granted by an equity
court—“equitable relief” can also refer to those categories of relief that
were typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and
restitution, but not compensatory damages). As memories of the divided
bench, and familiarity with its technical refinements, recede further into
“par[ties] in interest” and the plan. Id. § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106. One might reasonably conclude that the
greater breadth of fiduciary duties would displace the need to impose liability on non-fiduciaries for
participating in a breach of trust. In a later case, the Court did, however, impose liability for equitable
restitution upon a nonfiduciary who knowingly participated in a breach. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v.
Salomon Bros., 530 U.S. 238, 247–48, 253 (2000).
124. Hunter v. Caliber Sys., Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 718 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
125. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 252–53. See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text for a review of the
remedies available under ERISSA.
126. Id. at 255–56.
127. Id. at 257–58.
128. Id. at 255.
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 (1959).
130. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.
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the past, the former meaning becomes, perhaps, increasingly unlikely;
but it remains a question of interpretation in each case which meaning is
intended.131
Justice Scalia’s enumeration of historical equitable relief (i.e., “injunction,
mandamus, and restitution”) is both unhelpful and wrong.132 Injunction is plainly
equitable, but it is specifically authorized by ERISA itself.133 Perhaps the Court
invoked injunction in order to legitimize its exhumation of equity, but as an
example it illuminates nothing. Mandamus might seem equitable as it is coercive,
but it was an extraordinary legal remedy like quo warranto, prohibition, and
habeas corpus.134 At any rate, mandamus is directed at government officials and
the like,135 giving it little or no application to the typical ERISA case. Finally, as
discussed later, restitution is a modern invention, fusing legal and equitable
remedies. Restitution has a very significant equitable heritage but it was not a
remedy known to historical chancery.136
Justice Scalia’s real bungle in Mertens, though, was his assertion that courts in
equity granted legal relief in trust matters.137 The quote from Pomeroy, noting the
power to “establish purely legal rights and grant legal remedies which would
otherwise be beyond the scope of its authority,” had nothing to do with trust
law.138
In the days of the divided bench, an equity court might assume jurisdiction
over cases in which equity and law courts held “concurrent jurisdiction.” A
contract claim[ant] enforces a legal right but could seek both equitable relief (e.g.,
specific performance) and legal relief (e.g., damages).139 The equity court could
assert its (concurrent) jurisdiction over the claim if the “legal remedy [was] not,
under the circumstances, full, adequate, and complete.”140 And, “if the plaintiff
sought an injunction or specific performance, and was also entitled to damages,
the chancellor who granted equitable relief had jurisdiction to go on and grant

131. Id. at 256–57 (citation omitted) (quoting 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 181,
at 257 (5th ed. 1941)).
132. See Langbein, Trail of Error, supra note 22, at 1319–21 (criticizing majority’s opinion in
Mertens).
133. ERISA § 502(a)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(A) (2006).
134. Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 179–80 (2008).
135. “[M]andamus operates much in the nature of a bill in chancery for specific performance, the
principal difference being that the latter remedy is resorted to for the redress of purely private wrongs,
or the enforcement of contract rights, while the former generally has for its object the performance of
obligations arising out of official station, or specially imposed by law upon the respondent.” JAMES L.
HIGH, A TREATISE ON EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES, EMBRACING MANDAMUS, QUO WARRANTO, AND PROHIBITION
§ 1, at 4 (1874).
136. Nevertheless, interpreting section 502(a)(3) as authorizing all forms of restitution is a good
textual approach to the statute, for reasons discussed below. See infra Part III.D.
137. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256–57 (1993).
138. Id. at 256 (quoting 1 POMEROY, supra note 131, § 181, at 257) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
139. Id. at 256–57.
140. 1 POMEROY, supra note 131, § 173, at 234.
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damages as well, as a matter of economy of litigation.”141 This power is often
called the “clean-up” doctrine today.142
Trust law did not, however, belong to the concurrent jurisdiction and is not
subject to the clean-up doctrine. It belonged to the exclusive jurisdiction of equity
precisely because trusts were not enforceable at law. They created “purely
equitable estates and interests.”143 Indeed, because the trust beneficiary’s estate is
purely equitable, “the question never is asked, nor could be asked, whether the
remedies given him by a court of law are or are not adequate, since all legal
remedies are to him impossible.”144 In short, the legal powers described by Justice
Scalia exist only in the concurrent jurisdiction of equity. Trust remedies, in
contrast, exist only in the exclusive jurisdiction.
Despite mangling the ancient law he tried to resurrect, Justice Scalia had a
valid reason for limiting section 502(a)(3). As a textual matter, section 502(a)(3)
offers remedies more limited than those under section 409(a). While section
502(a)(3) offers “equitable relief,” section 409(a) offers “equitable or remedial
relief.”145 Unfortunately for employees, Russell had already limited section 409(a)
based on legislative history and purpose; when Mertens further constricted
section 502(a)(3), it left little of value to employees.
D.

Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson

Mertens seemed to authorize restitution under section 502(a)(3), saying that
it was typically available in equity.146 The goal of restitution is to “prevent unjust
enrichment of the defendant by making him give up what he wrongfully obtained
from the plaintiff.”147 Restitution is an area of law in its own right, having its own
Restatement148 and well-regarded treatises.149 The field is a modern invention,
largely formed in 1937 with the Restatement on Restitution.150 The Restatement
brought together several equitable and legal doctrines under the aegis of “the law
of restitution” one year before equitable and legal procedures were fused in the
federal judiciary.151 Thus, restitution includes the legal remedy of quasi-contract
the equitable remedies of constructive trust, equitable lien, accounting for profits,
and subrogation.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
relief.
146.
147.

DOBBS, supra note 74, § 2.7, at 83.
Langbein, Trail of Error, supra note 22, at 1350.
1 POMEROY, supra note 131, § 150a, at 204–05.
Id. § 219, at 370–71 (emphasis added).
See supra Part III.A for a discussion of statutory language in ERISA authorizing injunctive
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).
DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 4 (2d ed. 1993).

148. See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1937).
149. See generally 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1978).
150. See id. § 1.1, at 4 (“The term ‘restitution’ appears in early decisions, but general recognition
probably began with the publication of the Restatement of Restitution.” (footnote omitted)); Douglas
Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1989) (stating
Restatement on Restitution “created the field”).
151. See HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 14–15 (2d ed. 1948)
(describing attempts to unite law and equity procedure).
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In Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,152 the remedial tables
were turned because the plan sued the employee under section 502(a)(3).153
Great-West had paid the Knudsons’ medical expenses from an automobile
accident. Later, the employee settled with the tortfeasor. 154 The plan document
required the Knudsons to reimburse Great-West from the recovery.155 When
Great-West sued for reimbursement, the Knudsons refused, and the Supreme
Court held that Great-West could not enforce its reimbursement right under
section 502(a)(3).156
The Court’s analysis turned on the source of recovery. Because Great-West
sought recovery from the Knudsons’ general assets, rather than a specific fund, the
Court found that Great-West was seeking legal, not equitable, restitution.157 Later,
in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services,158 the plan sought payment from the
actual funds received in settlement rather than the general assets of the employee.
This difference allowed the Court to recognize the plan’s claim as an equitable lien
on the funds received, thus falling within the equitable restitution allowed by
section 502(a)(3).159
The Court in Great-West did not have the same textual dilemma as the Court
in Mertens. In Mertens, the Court felt compelled to interpret section 502(a)(3)
(“equitable relief”) more narrowly than section 409(a) (“equitable or remedial
relief”). The damages remedy naturally fell out. The Court in Great-West, though,
had no textual reason to diminish section 502(a)(3) even further by limiting it to
equitable restitution.
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion claimed that Congress plainly meant to limit
relief to remedies available in historic chancery practice. 160 In doing so, Justice
Scalia essentially lumped legal restitution in with the damages remedy—forms of
relief enforceable by a money judgment, rather than a contempt decree.161 This
enforcement mechanism is, according to Justice Scalia, what section 502(a)(3)
prohibits.162
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that section 502(a)(3) should be read to
allow both legal and equitable restitution.163 In fact, Great-West’s resort to
historical chancery practice runs counter to Justice Scalia’s own definition of
textualism—a search “for a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a
152. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
153. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 208.
154. Id. at 207.
155. Id. at 207–08.
156. Id. at 221.
157. Id. at 212–18; cf. POMEROY, supra note 131, § 112, at 147 (“[S]imple pecuniary recovery is, in
the vast majority of cases, legal, and not equitable, but it is not unknown in equity.”).
158. 547 U.S. 356 (2006).
159. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 362–63.
160. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217–18 (“It is, however, not our job to find reasons for what Congress
has plainly done; and it is our job to avoid rendering what Congress has plainly done (here, limit the
available relief) devoid of reason and effect.”).
161. Id. at 214–16.
162. Id. at 217–18.
163. Id. at 224–34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the
remainder of the corpus juris.”164
The corpus juris of ERISA’s enactment in 1974 was the eradication of
distinctions between law and equity that had started more than a century
earlier.165 Professor Dan Dobbs’ treatise on the law of remedies, first written in
1973, dismissed “classification of remedies as equitable or legal,” calling it
“misleading” and adding that “it is often unimportant to know whether a remedy
is equitable or legal now that courts of law and equity have merged.”166 Ironically,
Justice Scalia cited Dobbs as one of the “standard current works . . . which make
the answer clear” when lower courts must determine whether remedies are
equitable or legal in nature.167
Dobbs does, in fact, provide a coherent system of remedies that supports
Mertens but not Great-West. “Judicial remedies usually fall in one of four major
categories. (1) Damages remedies, (2) Restitutionary remedies, (3) Coercive
remedies, and (4) Declaratory remedies.”168 Focusing section 502(a)(3) on
restitution distinguishes it from section 409(a). Moreover, section 502(a)(3) does
not limit the scope of defendants—anyone can be liable under it. Yet, it could be
unfair to subject someone to damages who did not even breach an ERISA duty. It
would be fair, though, to subject them to restitution (i.e., the prevention of unjust
enrichment). By limiting section 502(a)(3) to equitable restitution, however,
Great-West simply resurrected dead law and fissioned restitution, even though the
field was the result of a deliberate fusion of law and equity that had occurred
decades before ERISSA was passed.
Great-West did not reach fiduciary breaches involving plan assets, which
remain subject to section 409(a). So, a fiduciary who wrongfully profits from the
use of plan assets will be liable to restore those profits to the plan, whether or not
recovery is to be made against specific property. 169 Thus, the core remedies of
trust law—redressing harm to or abuse of property—remain fully intact after
Great-West. What was almost certainly destroyed, however, was the ability to
redress mishandled claims and other non-asset breaches under section 502(a)(3).
The only effective remedy for such cases is damages, which Mertens excluded from

164. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997).
165. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 151, at 13–16 (discussing distinctions between law and equity
and attempts to reconcile the two).
166. DOBBS, supra note 74, § 1.1, at 3. The main remaining importance is the availability of a jury
trial under the Seventh Amendment and the discretionary nature of remedies. Id. § 1.2, at 8–9.
167. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217. Justice Scalia was likely referring to Dobbs’s multivolume
treatise, rather than the hornbook, although the substance of both is the same. My reason for quoting the
hornbook is that it is authoritative and contemporaneous with ERISA.
168. DOBBS, supra note 74, § 1.1, at 1. Douglas Laycock generally follows this scheme, although he
subdivides damages into compensatory and punitive elements and adds another class of ancillary
remedies (such as attorney fees and contempt powers). D OUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 2–6 (3d ed. 2002).
169. See ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006) (stating fiduciary is personally liable for
damages, restitution, and other appropriate equitable or remedial relief).

166

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

section 502(a)(3).170 Great-West went even farther, denying any remedy under
section 502(a)(3) if enforceable by a money judgment. 171 Responding to Mertens
and Great-West, scholars and policymakers have proposed that section 502(a)(3)
could accommodate money damages under the “make-whole” doctrine of trust
law, discussed in the next Part.
IV. THE “MAKE-WHOLE” THEORY AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
A.

Introduction

Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc.172 exemplifies the personal devastation
that can follow the mishandling of benefit claims. In that case, the fiduciary would
not pay to hospitalize a pregnant employee during the third trimester despite her
doctor’s recommendation.173 Arguably, the fiduciary breached its duties to the
employee and caused the death of the employee’s unborn child. Employees, like
Mrs. Corcoran, who suffer personal harm from a fiduciary breach need a money
remedy that makes them whole.
But ERISA currently offers them none. In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Russell,174 the Supreme Court held that section 409(a) could not redress
breaches that harm individual employees personally.175 In Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates,176 the Supreme Court held that the section 502(a)(3) does not offer the
money remedy of damages—at least against a nonfiduciary who participates in a
breach.177 The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on whether section
502(a)(3) could impose liability on a breaching fiduciary, but the implication of
Mertens is clear—damages are not available under section 502(a)(3). Without
sections 409(a) or 502(a)(3), employees like Mrs. Corcoran have nowhere to turn,
and they will continue to suffer personal harm without a remedy.
Critics hope that the Supreme Court will either limit or overrule Mertens and
open section 502(a)(3) to what they call “make-whole relief.”178 The make-whole
theorists claim that by authorizing appropriate equitable relief, section 502(a)(3)
adopts trust remedies which “make whole” beneficiaries harmed by breach. In
functional terms, make-whole relief is the same as the damages remedy; each is “a
money remedy aimed at making good the plaintiff’s losses.”179
To succeed, make-whole theory would need for the Supreme Court to reverse
or drastically curtail Mertens. The Department of Labor contends that Mertens

170. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260–62 (1992).
171. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 220–21.
172. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
173. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1322–23.
174. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
175. Russell, 473 U.S. at 140.
176. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
177. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 260–61.
178. See infra Part IV.D for a discussion of such criticisms.
179. See DOBBS, supra note 74, § 1.1, at 1 (“The damages remedy is a money remedy aimed at
making good the plaintiff's losses.”).
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denies damages against nonfiduciaries only,180 but the rationale of Mertens
suggests otherwise. The decision turned on the monetary nature of the relief
requested rather than the nonfiduciary status of the defendant. According to the
Court, any general award of money is legal, not equitable, relief. Mertens, however,
misinterpreted historical equity. Because trust law belonged to the exclusive
jurisdiction of equity, trust remedies were exclusively equitable. This mistake
makes Mertens a tempting target for reversal. But, as described in this Part, the
Court would be committing another mistake by adopting the make-whole theory.
B.

The Make-Whole Theory

In denying relief for individual harm under section 409(a), the Russell
majority disparaged the power of ERISA to grant any remedy to an individual for
fiduciary breach.181 According to the majority, ERISA fiduciary duties “relate to the
proper management, administration, and investment of fund assets, the
maintenance of proper records, the disclosure of specified information, and the
avoidance of conflicts of interest.”182 Only outside the fiduciary provisions does
ERISA create rights to enforce benefit promises.183 Later cases would make the
handling of claims fiduciary acts,184 but they remain outside the scope of section
409(a).
William Brennan and three other justices concurred with the Russell
majority.185 Alarmed by the narrowing of federal rights, they hoped to cabin
Russell within section 409(a).186 In Brennan’s view, Mrs. Russell simply
mispleaded her case. Section 502(a)(3), rather than 409(a), would offer relief
because “Congress intended to incorporate trust law into ERISA’s equitable
remedies.”187 As for trust remedies, “a fundamental concept of trust law,”

180. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 12, at 14.
181. See Langbein, Trail of Error, supra note 22, at 1341–42. The Court later allowed individual
remedies under section 502(a)(3). Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996).
182. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142–43 (1985). The focus on asset
management seeped into the Court’s preemption analysis a few years after Russell. See Massachusetts v.
Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 120–21 (1989) (exempting vacation-benefit plan from ERISA coverage because it
had no associated plan assets).
183. Russell, 473 U.S. at 143. Part 4 of ERISA Title I contains the fiduciary provisions, whereas Part
5 contains enforcement provisions.
184. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 219 (2004) (stating benefit determination is
“part and parcel” of ordinary fiduciary responsibilities); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996)
(concluding that section 502’s “catchall” provisions provide for appropriate equitable relief for injuries
caused by violations that section 502 does not elsewhere adequately remedy).
185. They were Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and White. Russell, 473 U.S. at 148 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
186. Later cases partially vindicated Brennan, holding that individuals could seek relief for a
fiduciary breach under section 502(a)(3) and could even seek relief under section 409(a) if the harm
was to assets held in an account for the individual. See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248,
256 (2008) (finding breach that harmed assets in defined contribution plan fell under § 409(a)); Varity,
516 U.S. at 509–11 (holding section 502(a)(3) is broad enough to permit individual relief for fiduciary
breach).
187. Russell, 473 U.S. at 157–58. The concurrence does not expressly say that section 502(a)(3)
incorporates trust remedies. But the concurrence repeatedly says that section 502(a)(3) redresses
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according to Brennan, “is that courts ‘will give to the beneficiaries of a trust such
remedies as are necessary for the protection of their interests.’”188
Following Russell, the Court in Mertens denied money damages under section
502(a)(3) under the (incorrect) view that an award of money is legal and outside
the “appropriate equitable relief” of section 502(a)(3).189 In dissent, Byron White
and three other justices190 detailed the make-whole theory. Rather than denying
monetary awards,
“[t]he traditional ‘equitable remedies’ available to a trust beneficiary
included compensatory damages. Equity ‘endeavor[ed] as far as possible
to replace the parties in the same situation as they would have been in, if
no breach of trust had been committed.’ This included, where necessary,
the payment of a monetary award to make the victims of the breach
whole.”191
Thus, according to White, the “appropriate equitable relief” of section 502(a)(3)
includes the “make-whole relief” of trust law.192 The Department of Labor,
scholars, judges, and justices have since rallied behind the make-whole theory and
called for damages under section 502(a)(3).193
Their calls, however, have not changed the law. The Department of Labor has
tried to distinguish Mertens, arguing that it bars damages only against
nonfiduciaries.194 These attempts have gone nowhere, and appellate judges
routinely deny make-whole relief, albeit under protest. 195 The rationale of Mertens
turns on the nature of relief rather than the identity of the defendant. Change, say
the appellate judges, must come from the Supreme Court or Congress. Congress
has done nothing, nor has the Supreme Court. Concurring in Aetna Health Inc. v.
Davila,196 a 2004 preemption decision, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer pleaded for
the Court to revisit Mertens and allow make-whole relief under section
502(a)(3).197
In 2008, the Court declined these pleas by denying certiorari in Amschwand v.
Spherion Corp.198 Thomas Amschwand, afflicted with cancer, had left work on a
medical leave but tried to maintain life insurance coverage from his employer,

fiduciary breaches and supports the argument with repeated references to trust law. See, e.g., id.
188. Id. at 157 (quoting 3 A. SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 199, at 1638 (1967)).
189. See generally Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
190. The other justices were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and O’Connor. Id. at 263
(White, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 266 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting JAMES HILL, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO TRUSTEES, THEIR POWERS, DUTIES, PRIVILEGES, AND LIABILITIES 522 (4th ed.
1845)).
192. Id. at 266–67.
193. See Harthill, supra note 11, at 723–26 (providing examples of support and criticism of the
“make-whole” theory).
194. Id. at 747–48.
195. Id. at 724 & n.14, 15 & 19.
196. 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
197. Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
198. 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008).
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Spherion.199 During this time, Spherion replaced its former insurer with Aetna.
The new Aetna policy excluded employees on medical leave, like Amschwand,
until they returned to work for one day. This exclusion was not communicated to
Amschwand, who arguably could have returned to work for a day to keep his
coverage.200 Aetna’s policy purported to waive the exclusion for those employees
identified by Spherion as being on preexisting medical leave. 201 Spherion did not
transmit Amschwand’s name to Aetna, and Amschwand did not receive coverage
when the new policy became effective. Spherion assured Amschwand he was
covered.202 He never returned to work but continued paying premiums until his
death.203 His widow filed a claim for benefits, but Aetna denied the claim because
of the exclusion.204 The widow then sued for make-whole relief under section
502(a)(3).205
The Fifth Circuit denied the widow relief, relying on Mertens and its
progeny.206 The Department of Labor and Solicitor General viewed Amschwand as
a vehicle for the Supreme Court to modify or overrule Mertens.207 By following
Mertens, the Fifth Circuit would not redress a clear fiduciary breach that
devastated an employee’s widow.208 Thus, the United States supported Mrs.
Amschwand’s petition for certiorari,209 but the Supreme Court nevertheless
denied it.210 The make-whole theory may remain alive, but just barely, after
Amschwand.211

199. Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 505 F.3d 342, 343–44 (5th Cir. 2007).
200. Id. at 344.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 343. The decisions of the Fifth Circuit and district court suggest that Mrs. Amschwand
sued only under section 502(a)(3) for breach of fiduciary duty. Mrs. Amschwand should have also sued
under section 502(a)(1)(B) as she was not seeking extra-contractual damages but simply benefits due.
Also, the premiums that Mr. Amschwand paid to Spherion were plan assets. Spherion breached its
fiduciary duties by not dedicating these assets to the purchase of a life insurance policy for Mr.
Amschwand. Under LaRue, Spherion could be held liable for this breach with respect to assets, even
though the remedy would flow only to Mrs. Amschwand.
206. See id. at 343, 345–48 (observing that Supreme Court had already limited relief available
under section 502(a)(3) to remedies typically awarded in courts of equity).
207. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 12.
208. Id. at 20.
209. Id. at 21.
210. See Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008) (denying petition for certiorari); see
also Andrew L. Oringer, A Regulatory Vacuum Leaves Gaping Wounds—Can Common Sense Offer a Better
Way to Address the Pain of ERISA Preemption?, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 409, 421–23 (2008) (providing
a detailed description of Amschwand).
211. Commentators differ on whether the make-whole theory remains viable at all after
Amschwand. Compare Thomas P. Gies & Jane R. Foster, Leaving Well Enough Alone: Reflections on the
Current State of ERISA Remedial Law, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 449, 467 (2008) (arguing that Court’s
refusal to hear Amschwand conclusively excludes make-whole relief from section 502(a)(3)), with
Secunda, supra note 6, at 174 (arguing that make-whole theory remains viable).
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How the Trust-Law Analogy Fails

In interpreting ERISA, the Supreme Court follows trust law (or at least tries
to). Perhaps its most comprehensive application of trust law to ERISA is Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch.212 In Firestone, one company bought a division of
another company.213 The employees of the acquired division claimed that the
transaction resulted in their termination of employment, thus entitling them to
severance benefits.214 The employer denied the claim because the employees
continued working for the acquiring employer.215 The question before the Court
was how to review the employer’s decisionmaking as the plan’s fiduciary.216
The Supreme Court decided Firestone using the law of trusts, likening the
ERISA fiduciary to a traditional trustee.217 According to this trust-regulatory
model, the Court ruled that fiduciary decisionmaking is generally reviewed de
novo.218 However, if the governing document reserves discretion to the employer,
then the federal courts will overturn the fiduciary’s decision only if its decision is
arbitrary and capricious.219 The natural outcome of Firestone was that every welladvised employer amended its plans to reserve to it—or its appointed fiduciary—
the appropriate discretion in administering plan claims. So, the de facto standard
of review in ERISA cases asks whether the denial was arbitrary and capricious.
Rather than entangling itself with state trust law, the Court could have
answered Firestone under the text of ERISA. Firestone involved an ERISA fiduciary
who had to decide whether employees were eligible for benefits under the
standard set forth in the plan document. Trust law gives a clear analogue in those
very common situations in which a trustee is directed to pay income or principal
for the “support” or “education” of a beneficiary. In those cases, the beneficiary
cannot challenge the amount that “the trustee in the exercise of a sound discretion
deems necessary for [the beneficiary’s] education or support.” 220 Under trust law,
then, eligibility for trust distributions involves trustee discretion that will be
overturned only if abused. And, the Court had no need to search through
Restatements of Trusts to find this answer. The text of ERISA, like trust law,
imposes a duty of prudence (i.e., reasonableness) on its fiduciaries in the
administration of employee benefit plans.221 As a textual matter, the Court could
have simply said that the benefit determinations would be subject to the same
standard of reasonableness that applies to all other fiduciary acts.

212. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
213. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 105.
214. Id. at 105–06.
215. Id. at 106.
216. Id. at 108.
217. Id. at 110–11.
218. Id. at 112.
219. See id. at 109–12 (observing that federal courts have adopted arbitrary and capricious
standard).
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 128 cmt. e. (1959).
221. See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (requiring fiduciaries to act with
diligence and prudence).
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The use of trust law, rather than the text of ERISA, in Firestone was peculiar
because the severance plan was not even a trust. ERISA health and welfare plans
are often not trusts.222 The standard definition of a trust is “a fiduciary
relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to
the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of
another person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to
create it.”223 Scott’s treatise breaks this definition into five components:
(1) a trust is a relationship;
(2) it is a relationship of a fiduciary character;
(3) it is a relationship with respect to property, not one involving merely
personal duties;
(4) it subjects the person who holds title to the property to duties to
deal with it for the benefit of charity or [sic] one or more persons, at
least one of whom is not the sole trustee; and
(5) it arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create the
relationship.224
All ERISA plans satisfy (1) because they are relationships in the sense used
by Scott, as they involve both the rights of employees 225 and the duties of the
ERISA fiduciaries.226 As for (5), ERISA plans are voluntary structures, entered into
only with the manifest, written intent of the employer.227 Because plans are
voluntary, the Supreme Court has often hesitated to rule against employers out of
fear that additional liability will thwart the formation of ERISA plans.228 Even

222. Professor Donald Bogan has previously criticized the role of trust law in ERISA cases. Under
Firestone, courts will defer to a fiduciary’s denial of benefits if the plan expressly grants discretion to the
fiduciary. Professor Bogan notes that ERISA plans share far more in common with insurance contracts
than with donative trusts. See Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Foundational Insufficiencies for Deferential
Review in Employee Benefit Claims—Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
147, 196 (2009) (“These considerations, which form the foundation for court deference under donative
trust law, have no relation to a contract of insurance.”); see also Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: Re-thinking
Firestone in Light of Great-West—Implications for Standard of Review and the Right to a Jury Trial in
Welfare Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 629, 694 (2004) (concluding article with plea for “reevaluation of Firestone, the ERISA standard of review issue, and the question of a plan participant's right
to a jury trial in claims for benefits due under an ERISA plan”); Donald T. Bogan & Benjamin Fu, ERISA:
No Further Inquiry into Conflicted Plan Administrator Claim Denials, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 637, 684 (2005)
(arguing that courts “have not adhered to trust law's no-further-inquiry rule in the analysis of what
standard of review to apply in ERISA benefits claims litigation tarnished by a plan administrator's
conflict of interest”).
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959); BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 13, § 1.
224. 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 2.1.3 (5th ed. 2006).
225. Cf. ERISA §§ 502, 503, 514, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1133, 1144 (detailing enforcement rights under
ERISA).
226. Cf. id. §§ 101–05, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021–31 (detailing reporting and disclosure requirements); id.
§§ 401–14, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–14 (detailing fiduciary duties).
227. See id. § 402(a)(1), 9 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (“Every employee benefit plan shall be established
and maintained pursuant to a written instrument.”).
228. See generally Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008); Aetna Health Inc. v.
Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 376 (2002);
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 144 (1990); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 42
(1987).
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though ERISA does contain mandatory terms that cannot be altered by the
governing plan document,229 employers enter into ERISA plans only voluntarily.
The text of ERISA mandates fiduciary duties, which are arguably satisfying the
requirement of (2) that the relationship be of a fiduciary character.230
What remains a problem, however, is fitting ERISA plans into characteristics
(3) and (4) dealing with trust property. While “[a]n interest in property is always
an element of a trust,”231 many ERISA plans have no associated assets. They are
simply promises to pay benefits from the general funds of the employer,232
involving “merely personal duties” of the employer.233 Trust law does not act as a
less formal body of contract law, enforcing gratuitous promises unsupported by
consideration. “The promise to give cannot be tortured into a trust declaration . . .
.”234 This is because personal promises are not property. Or, as Justice Scalia once
quipped, “[a] trust without a res can no more be created by legislative decree than
can a pink rock-candy mountain.”235
One might claim that this black-letter critique is unfair to the trust-model of
ERISA. Austin Scott, author of the five characteristics, viewed trust law as property
law, a means by which the settlor grants a property interest, enforceable by courts
in equity, to a beneficiary.236 A more modern account, still based on property,
comes from Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei, who claim that trust serves to
establish the rights of different creditors. 237 In particular, trust law serves to grant
broad power to the trustee while protecting trust property from the claims of the
trustee’s personal creditors.238 Robert Sitkoff proposes a similar account, viewing
trust law as a means to control the agency costs that come with broad managerial
power over assets.239

229. See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (requiring fiduciary to administer plan
according to plan document “insofar as . . . consistent with the provisions of [ERISA]”); id. § 410, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1110) (prohibiting the exculpation of plan fiduciaries from ERISA liability).
230. See id. § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (mandating that “a fiduciary shall discharge his duties
with respect to a plan solely in the interests of the participants and the beneficiaries”).
231. BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 13, § 1.
232. See Muir, supra note 31 (explaining welfare benefit plans often do not need to establish trust
since benefits are payable from plan sponsor’s general fund).
233. SCOTT ET AL., supra note 224.
234. Unthank v. Rippstein, 386 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex. 1964). Even modern authorities follow this
rule. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 16(2) (2003) (“If a property owner intends to make an
outright gift inter vivos but fails to make the transfer that is required in order to do so, the gift intention
will not be given effect by treating it as a declaration of trust.”).
235. Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 70 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia might have been
thinking of the mythical hobo paradise praised in the song “Big Rock Candy Mountain.” See generally
HARRY MCCLINTOCK, Big Rock Candy Mountain, on O BROTHER WHERE ART THOU? (Lost Highway Records
2000).
236. See Austin Wakeman Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 COLUM. L. REV.
269, 270 (1917) (observing that trust is formed by transfer of property and distinguishing trust law
from contract law).
237. See generally Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal
and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434 (1998).
238. Id. at 437–38.
239. See generally Sitkoff, supra note 53.
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While Scott’s property-centric view might be considered the dominant one, it
has detractors. The most pointed is Professor John Langbein, who claimed that
“[t]rusts are deals.”240 Langbein does not appear to go so far as to claim, though,
that trust law has no need for property, rather that the “trust deal” is the
“distinguishing feature of the trust” which “defines the powers and
responsibilities of the trustee in managing the property.” 241 The actual
conveyance of property is, in Langbein’s view, a mere “background event.”242
Trusts might be deals, but they are deals about property. Property is the key
feature of trusts for purposes of this Article because the rights of a trust
beneficiary are, ultimately, rights to trust property. The trust beneficiary can
demand that the trustee administer trust property according to the trust
instrument and the fiduciary duties of trust law. But the beneficiary cannot go
beyond that and demand financial support directly from the trustee or settlor. In
contrast, many ERISA plans have no trust property or have trust property that
merely secures personal promises to provide benefits.
The line between promise and property, though, is not always clear. Almost
ninety years ago, Roscoe Pound wrote, “[w]ealth, in a commercial age, is made up
largely of promises.”243 Most financial assets could be described as promises (e.g.,
stocks, bonds, mutual fund holdings).244
Financial assets, even if “promises,” can be bought and sold by the trustee.
Without the duty of loyalty, trustees could enjoy these financial assets for
themselves. In contrast, a trustee’s own promise looks less like property subject to
fiduciary administration. For this reason, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts,
which was effective at the enactment of ERISA, prohibited the creation of a trust
with obligations enforceable against the trustee personally. 245 So, “if a person
makes a note payable to himself as trustee for a third person, or if he makes a note
payable to bearer and declares himself trustee of the note for a third person, no
trust is created, and the the [sic] third person has no enforceable claim against the
maker.”246
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts liberalizes this prohibition somewhat
stating that “a chose in action consisting of a legally enforceable claim against the
trustee may be held in trust.”247 In order to create a trust, though, the settlor must

240. Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 13, at 671.
241. Id. at 627.
242. Id.
243. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 133 (8th prtg. 1966), quoted in
Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 13, at 637.
244. Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 13, at 638; see also BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES,
supra note 13, § 115, at 333–37 (discussing “notes, bonds, obligations under other contracts, shares of
stock, bank deposits, and claims under an insurance policy” as common choses in action held in trust
(footnotes omitted)).
245. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 87 (Tentative Draft. No. 4, 1957) (“An obligor cannot be
trustee of the duties which he owes to the obligee . . . .”).
246. Id. § 87 cmt. a.
247. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 40 cmt. b (2003). The position of the Third Restatement may
reflect the law at the time ERISA was passed. See SCOTT ET AL., supra note 224, § 10.11, at 580–82 (“The
Third Restatement [abandons] the traditional rule and . . . acknowledges that a trustee can hold his or
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actually declare herself trustee of the chose in action or transfer it to a third party
trustee.248 The Third Restatement will not torture a contract into a trust and
distinguishes between promise and property as follows:
10. In consideration of valuable services that have subsequently been
performed by B, A promised B that on the first of the next month he (A)
will transfer certain securities to T in trust for B. Although no trust
arises until A transfers the securities to T in trust, A is liable for breach
of contract if he fails to create the trust.
11. In consideration of funds that have since been received from B’s
parents, A executed a signed writing promising T that on the first of the
next month he (A) will convey Blackacre to T in trust for B. A delivers
the writing to T, informing her that it is his intention thereby to create a
trust for B’s benefit. T thereby acquires a right to specifically enforce the
contract or to recover damages from A if he breaks his promise, and she
now holds these rights in trust for B.249
Even if one thinks that the unfunded ERISA plan resembles illustration eleven
rather than ten, the plan must clear even more hurdles to be a trust under the
Third Restatement. A chose in action must be “definite or ascertainable.” 250 So,
there is no trust with respect to a chose in action that “remains wholly in the
control of the settlor or if its description is so indefinite that it cannot be
ascertained.”251 Yet, “[e]mployers or other plan sponsors are generally free under
ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans.”252
Even the most modern, post-ERISA authorities would not recognize an unfunded
benefit promise as a trust.
D.

Make-Whole Relief Redresses Harm to Trust Property

Critics of ERISA decisions point to trust law as the way to expand remedies
under section 502(a)(3). Yet, the necessity of property divides ERISA and trust
law. Without property (a res), one cannot create a trust, but one can create an
ERISA plan. This subsection shows that property is just as central to trust
remedies as it is to trust formation.

her own debt in trust for another.”).
248. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 10 cmt. g (2003) (“If, however, a person makes or causes to
be made an enforceable promise to pay money or transfer property to another as trustee, and if the
person (with the expressed or implied acceptance of the intended trustee) also manifests an intention
immediately to create a trust of the promisee's rights, a trust is created at the time of the contract, with a
chose in action (the rights under that contract) then being held for the beneficiaries by the trustee.”).
249. Id. § 10 cmt. g, illus. 10–11.
250. Id. § 40 cmt. e.
251. Id.
252. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995). Moreover, the trustee of a
revocable trust owes a fiduciary duty only to the settlor rather than other beneficiaries. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 74 cmt. a(1) (2007) (“[D]espite the lack of enforceable fiduciary duties in these
circumstances, a valid trust exists . . . .”).
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Professor Langbein and the Bogert Treatise

The make-whole theory originated in Justice Brennan’s concurrence in
Russell and Justice White’s dissent in Mertens, but it has found its most complete
exposition in a 2003 article by Professor John Langbein. 253 Langbein repeatedly
refers to make-whole relief as “routine” under trust law, 254 but the trust
authorities he cites do not fill the void of current ERISA remedies. The centerpiece
of Langbein’s argument is a passage from the Bogert treatise on trusts, which
reads as follows:
The extent of liability in the cases within this section is determined by
the general rule that the object of damages is to make the injured party
whole. Stated otherwise, the goal is to put the injured party in the same
condition in which they would have been had the wrong had not been
committed and the trustee had done his or her duty. Both direct and
consequential damages may be awarded. Costs, counsel fees and
expenses of litigation would fall within the latter type of award and are
granted by the courts in their discretion when they deem the breach has
been the cause of their being incurred.255
Langbein misuses this passage, failing to note that his centerpiece quote deals
with the investment duties of a trustee, a point the Bogert treatise makes perfectly
clear.256 But, Langbein is not agitating for a make-whole theory to deal with
investment losses, which ERISA already redresses under section 409(a). What
Langbein needs, in order to make his case, are trust authorities that redress
personal harm to beneficiaries.
The closest Langbein comes is another passage from Bogert that states:
In suits to collect money from a trustee for breach of trust, the direct
damages will usually be measured by the difference between the value
of the beneficiary’s rights to principal and income before and after the
breach, but consequential damages may also be awarded, and
exemplary or punitive damages may be awarded where malice or fraud
is involved.257
This passage appears promising, but the cases Bogert cites also deal with trust
investments.258 The sole outlier, decided after the passage of ERISA, imposed

253. Langbein, Trail of Error, supra note 22, at 1319–20. Langbein’s article has been relied upon by
concurring justices in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 223 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring), and
by the Solicitor General. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 12, at 13.
254. See, e.g., Langbein, Trail of Error, supra note 22, at 1320 (“[T]he drafters of ERISA were
evoking the relief routinely obtainable for breach of trust.”); id. at 1321 (referring to “routine makewhole relief”).
255. BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 13, § 701, quoted in Langbein, Trail of Error, supra
note 22, at 1319–20.
256. BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 13, § 701 (“The object of this chapter is to discuss the
extent of the trustee's financial liability for breach of his duties with regard to making (or failing to
make), retaining, or selling trust investments. Additionally, it will discuss the methods that the courts
use in measuring that liability.”).
257. Id. § 862.
258. Id. § 862, at 50 n.33.
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damages upon a trustee based not on its acts as trustee but on its contractual
estate-planning relationship with a beneficiary.259
I do not claim that trust law never redresses personal harm to beneficiaries.
For example, the court in Marsman v. Nasca260 appeared ready to impose personal
liability upon a trustee for the harm he caused to a beneficiary’s personal
interests. The beneficiary’s widow convinced the court that the beneficiary had to
convey his home because the trustee failed to provide for the beneficiary’s
support, as required by the trust agreement.261 Forcing the trustee to pay the
withheld funds to the widow was easy, but arguably does not make her whole
because of the loss of the home. The court appeared willing to impose additional
personal liability upon the trustee; it elected against doing so, however, because
the trust agreement contained an exculpatory clause.262 Perhaps similar cases
exist, but they are not evident from either Langbein or Bogert. The make-whole
doctrine is routine to investment losses but not personal harm.
2.

The Remedies of the Second Restatement of Trusts

The natural place to look for trust remedies is the Second Restatement, which
reigned as the authority on trust law when Congress passed ERISA in 1974. The
later Third Restatement and Uniform Trust Code cannot be evidence of the trust
system Congress intended to adopt. But, like Bogert’s treatise, the Second
Restatement does not address personal harm suffered by beneficiaries. In fact, it
does not speak of make-whole relief at all outside its citations to ERISA cases.
With limited exception, the remedies available to a trust beneficiary against a
trustee are exclusively equitable.263 The only legal remedy available is an action to
enforce an unconditional and immediate right to payment of money or transfer of
personal property from the trust.264 The remaining trust remedies, all equitable,
allow a trust beneficiary to bring a suit to:
(a) to compel the trustee to perform his duties as trustee;
(b) to enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust;
(c) to compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust;
(d) to appoint a receiver to take possession of the trust property
and administer the trust; [or]

259. Merrick v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 1095, 1101 (4th Cir. 1988).
260. 573 N.E.2d 1025 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). In Marsman, the court found the trustee to have
breached by not inquiring into the financial needs of his beneficiary. Id. at 1029–31. The beneficiary was
forced to convey a remainder interest in his house to his stepdaughter. Upon the beneficiary’s death, his
widow sued the trustee. Id. at 1029. The court ordered the trustee to transfer funds to the widow that
should have been paid to the beneficiary. Id. at 1031. The court would not, however, impose personal
liability on the trustee because of an exculpatory clause. Id. at 1033. Marsman is well known to many
professors who teach trusts and estates because of its inclusion in JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS,
AND ESTATES 598–604 (8th ed. 2009).
261. Marsman, 573 N.E.2d at 1030.
262. Id. at 1032–33.
263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 (1959).
264. Id. § 198.
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(e) to remove the trustee.”265
The third remedy, allowing a suit to “redress a breach of trust,” should be the
core of the make-whole theory. But, the redress allowed by the Second
Restatement concerns itself with harms to or abuse of trust property. To quote:
If the trustee commits a breach of trust, he is chargeable with
(a) any loss or depreciation in value of the trust estate resulting from
the breach of trust; or
(b) any profit made by him through the breach of trust; or
(c) any profit which would have accrued to the trust estate if there
had been no breach of trust.266
The Second Restatement, just like ERISA section 409(a), redresses harm to or
abuse of plan assets.267
The make-whole theory would need to reverse cases, like Corcoran, that
preclude relief for wrongful denials and delays. The Second Restatement
redresses these breaches but only barely. If the denial or delay is an intentional
breach, the beneficiary is entitled to interest:
If the breach of trust consists in the failure to pay to the beneficiary
trust funds to which he is entitled, the trustee is ordinarily chargeable
with interest at the legal rate if he intentionally violated his duty to the
beneficiary in withholding payment. If, however, his failure to pay was
due to a reasonable doubt as to his duty to make payment, he is not
liable, during the period while the question of his duty is being litigated,
for any interest except such as he has actually received or should have
received during that period. In such a case the trustee should ordinarily
not invest the money but should deposit it in a bank in order that he
may be in a position to pay it over immediately if the court should so
decree.268
3.

Professor Harthill’s Defense of the Make-Whole

Professor Susan Harthill defends the make-whole theory from the charge that
trust remedies redress harm only to trust property.269 It is true that she identifies
examples of relief not predicated upon harm to plan assets. But, the relief is not
make-whole (i.e., damages) but restitution. The primary goal of damages is to
compensate a plaintiff for loss.270 In contrast, restitution “prevent[s] unjust
enrichment of the defendant by making him give up what he wrongfully obtained
from the plaintiff.”271 The ERISA make-whole theory is one of damages as it would
compensate the plaintiff.

265. Id. § 199.
266. Id. § 205.
267. See supra note 71 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 409(a).
268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 207 cmt. c.
269. Harthill, supra note 11, at 723.
270. DOBBS, supra note 74, § 1.1, at 3. Dobbs includes punitive damages within the category of
damages while Laycock places them within a separate category. LAYCOCK, supra note 133, at 2–6.
271. DOBBS, supra note 74, § 1.1, at 4.
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Professor Harthill points to a comment in the Second Restatement “[w]here a
trustee of shares of stock uses his power as shareholder to make an improper
profit.”272 In this case, the trustee “is liable for the profit so made” even if the
breach has not diminished trust property.273 But this is not make-whole relief;
neither the trust estate nor its beneficiaries have suffered harm that must be made
whole. Instead, it is restitution, imposed to prevent the unjust enrichment of the
disloyal fiduciary. And, ERISA section 409(a) expressly imposes restitution on
disloyal fiduciaries274 as does trust law.275
What Professor Harthill needs are trust authorities redressing harm that is
personal to the beneficiaries. She discusses West v. Biscoe,276 in which “the settlor
left land to her sons on the condition that they paid $500 to each of her two
granddaughters.”277 The sons did not perform on the obligation. The widower of
one of the granddaughters sued in equity, and the chancellor imposed a personal
obligation of payment upon the sons.278 Professor Harthill characterizes the case
as a breach of trust,279 but it was not. The sons were not trustees, and the
chancellor dismissed the bill of complaint as to the actual trustee.280 Instead, the
settlor created an equitable charge upon the sons,281 which is not a fiduciary
relationship.282
The title of Professor Harthill’s article, “A Square Peg in a Round Hole,”
acknowledges the difficulty in using trust law to redress personal harm to
beneficiaries.283 To date, though, neither peg nor hole has given way. Courts
routinely deny relief when harm does not fall into the trust model of section

272. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. o (1959); Harthill, supra note 11, at 759 (stating
“a trustee who receives a bonus or commission from a third party for an act done by the trustee in
connection with trust administration is liable for breach of the duty of loyalty”).
273. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. o (1959).
274. See ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006) (forcing breaching fiduciaries to “restore to
[the] plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan”).
275. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205(b) (holding trustee liable for “any profit made by
him through the breach of trust”).
276. 6 H. & J. 460 (Md. 1825).
277. Harthill, supra note 11, at 774 (citing West, 6 H. & J. at 460–61). This quote misstates the facts
slightly, as the settlor created a trust during her lifetime, not by will, and the charge was for £500, not
$500. West, 6 H. & J., at 460–61.
278. Harthill, supra note 11, at 774–75.
279. Id.
280. West, 6 H & J. at 463.
281. Id. at 466 (“[T]he portion claimed is a charge in equity upon the estate conveyed in trust . . .
.”).
282. See BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 13, § 31 (“[A]bsence of a fiduciary duty in the
equitable charge is the most important distinction between a charge and trust.”). West held that the
charge would be enforceable against the sons personally in equity. West, 6 H & J. at 469. The Bogert
treatise, though, states personal obligation is enforceable at law. See BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra
note 13, § 31 (“[A] charge beneficiary has two legal remedies: (1) to impose a personal obligation
against the transferee subject to the charge and (2) to impose in rem rights against the property.”).
283. Indeed, Professor Harthill acknowledges that the trust authorities do not satisfactorily
answer the question. See Harthill, supra note 11, at 765 (“[T]he Bogert treatise does not satisfactorily
resolve the debate of what conditions attached to make-whole relief . . . .”).
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409(a). The make-whole theory would grant relief only if the Supreme Court is
willing to shave the sharp edges off of trust remedies.
E.

Conclusion

After Russell284 limited section 409(a) to plan-level and asset-based breaches,
section 502(a)(3) was the only place left to redress harm personal to
beneficiaries. With the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Amschwand,285
though, the faint hope for make-whole relief under of section 502(a)(3) may have
flickered out.
The make-whole theory’s practical failure follows its theoretical weakness.
Make-whole theorists must claim that Congress incorporated trust remedies into
section 502(a)(3) by granting “appropriate equitable relief.” Yet, trust remedies
focus on the integrity of trust assets, just as Russell focused ERISA remedies on the
integrity of plan assets. Trust law is the problem with ERISA remedies, not the
solution.
Rather than looking to trust law and cryptic references to equity, the courts
and commentators should look again at the text of section 409(a) to redress all
fiduciary breaches, including personal harm to beneficiaries. Russell, of course,
precludes this interpretation of section 409(a). But, the rationale—if not
holding—of Mertens precludes a court from granting damages under section
502(a)(3). Remedial expansion can come only after the Supreme Court revisits its
precedents, and reformers should start at the beginning with Russell and the text
of section 409(a).
V.

OVERTURNING RUSSELL AND REDRESSING ALL FIDUCIARY BREACHES UNDER ERISA
§409(a)

Section 409(a) allows a court to impose upon a breaching fiduciary such
“equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate.” 286 Yet, reading
the statute as a whole and in light of the legislative history, the Court concluded
that Congress was “primarily concerned with the possible misuse of plan assets,
and with remedies that would protect the entire plan, rather than with the rights
of the an individual beneficiary.”287 Prior scholars have focused their attention on
why Congress intended to grant full remedies under ERISA.288
Rather than duplicate those efforts, I hope to bolster them with arguments
from the text of the statute. Here (again) is the text of section 409(a), black-lined
to highlight and aid the reader in evaluating the textual merits of Russell:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any
of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by
this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

See supra Part III.B for a discussion of Russell.
See supra notes 198–210 and accompanying text for a discussion of Amschwand.
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 138 (1984).
Id. at 142.
See generally, Harthill, supra note 11.
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such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through
use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate,
including removal of such fiduciary.289
Relief under the black-lined text flows exclusively to the plan since the breaching
fiduciary must “make good to such plan any losses” and “restore to such plan any
profits” associated with the breach.290 Thus, the Court found the black-lined text
establishes a context of plan-level relief that must apply to a later grant of
“equitable or remedial relief” as well.291
The Court’s reasoning was based implicitly on the canon of ejusdem generis,
which is “[a] canon of construction that when a general word or phrase follows a
list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only
items of the same type as those listed.”292 The black-lined text is not, however, a
lengthy list that establishes an unmistakable context of plan-level relief.
Alternatively, the Court could have been applying noscitur a sociis, the “canon of
construction holding that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be
determined by the words immediately surrounding it.”293 For example, the Court
seemed to think that referring to a fiduciary “with respect to a plan” made the
focus on plan-level relief clear.294 But, this is simply the unnecessarily long phrase
used by the ERISA definitional section; every fiduciary is a “fiduciary with respect
to a plan.”295
The text does, however, pose a conundrum. A broad interpretation of the
general phrase “equitable or remedial relief” might render the specific forms of
plan-level relief superfluous. Yet, a narrow interpretation might render the
general phrase itself superfluous.296 The Court chose the latter, but never
explained in Russell exactly what type of relief would come under “equitable and
remedial relief.” Later cases under section 502(a)(3) eroded the need for
“equitable or remedial relief” under section 409(a). 297 The Court interpreted
section 502(a)(3)’s grant of “equitable relief” as redressing a fiduciary breach in
Varity and as benefitting the plan as a whole in Harris Trust.
I suggest the following interpretation of section 409(a). The plan-level relief,
black-lined above, adopts the traditional remedies for breach of trust. They neatly
track the remedies of the Second Restatement, as discussed above, by protecting
the integrity of plan assets. Nevertheless, Congress went beyond trust remedies by

289. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006).
290. Id.
291. Russell, 473 U.S. at 140 (emphasis omitted).
292. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (8th ed. 2004).
293. Id. at 1087.
294. Russell, 473 U.S. at 140 (emphasis added).
295. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
296. Cf. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:17, at
374 (7th ed. 2007) (stating that canon applies where “the class is not exhausted by the enumeration”).
The same parties that can enforce section 409(a) have independent authority under section 502(a)(3) to
seek “equitable relief” against breaching fiduciaries. The Secretary of Labor technically proceeds under
section 502(a)(5), which is indistinguishable from 502(a)(3) for this purpose.
297. See generally Russell, 473 U.S. 134.
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also granting “such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate” 298 to redress fiduciary breach, including redress for harm to a
beneficiary’s personal interest.
This interpretation achieves all the goals of the make-whole theory without
contorting the remedies of trust law or the text of ERISA. Most importantly, it
avoids historical equity. Section 409(a) authorizes “equitable and remedial relief,”
which is obviously broader than the limited “equitable relief” available under
section 502(a)(3). The logical reading of “equitable or remedial relief” includes the
main forms of monetary remedies: damages (i.e., making plaintiffs whole) and
restitution (i.e., preventing defendant’s unjust enrichment). Section 409(a)
specifies plan-level damages (“losses to the plan”) and plan-level restitution
(“profits of [the] fiduciary”) before granting general relief (“equitable or remedial
relief”). Russell interpreted the specific relief as focusing on types of plan-level
relief but could have readily found it focusing on types of damages and restitution.
Yet this is not the most important contextual clue. Section 409(a) redresses
fiduciary breaches specifically whereas section 502(a)(3) redresses ERISA
violations generically. This fact alone supports using section 409(a) to redress all
ERISA fiduciary breaches, not just those involving plan assets or the plan as a
whole. Courts should redress fiduciary breaches with the provision drafted for
that purpose.
Redressing fiduciary breach under section 409(a) would also relieve the
pressure placed on section 502(a)(3). Despite bungling historical equity, Mertens
contains a core truth. “‘Equitable’ relief,” Justice Scalia wrote, “must mean
something less than all relief.”299 Damages naturally fall from section 502(a)(3)
because “simple pecuniary recovery is, in the vast majority of cases, legal, and not
equitable.”300 Moreover, an expansive section 502(a)(3) potentially subjects
nonfiduciaries to damages, even though they generally owe no duties to
employees covered by ERISA plans. In the case of fiduciary breach, section 409(a)
should offer full relief. In cases of other ERISA violations, section 502(a)(3) should
ordinarily offer narrower relief.
Great-West was unnecessary because Mertens, by excluding damages, had
already solved the textual problem of limiting section 502(a)(3). Once damages
were removed from section 502(a)(3), there was no further need to limit its scope
to ensure textual coherence. Restitution—the prevention of unjust enrichment—
should always be available in its legal and equitable forms under section
502(a)(3). Historically and procedurally, restitution mixes law and equity. Yet, as
Professor Dobbs points out, “[t]he substantive basis of restitution is related to
substantive equity. That is, courts applying substantive equity and courts applying
the law of unjust enrichment are both applying a law of ‘good conscience.’”301
The system I propose is admittedly only a sketch of ERISA remedies,
intended to show that the text, rather than trust law, is the solution to ERISA
remedies. Courts would still need to consider a variety of issues under section
298.
299.
300.
301.

ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 258 n.8 (1993).
1 POMEROY, supra note 131, § 112, at 147.
See DOBBS, supra note 74, § 4.1, at 370.
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409(a), such as whether to grant punitive damages, whether to redress
noneconomic loss (e.g., pain and suffering), and how to limit consequential
damages.302 ERISA section 510 may also pose a problem. It prohibits employers
from interfering with their employee’s rights to benefits; firing an employee on
the eve of vesting is the prototypical violation.303 Since section 510 contains no
express remedies, employees must turn to section 502(a)(3) for enforcement.
Some courts, however, have denied awards for backpay on the grounds that they
are legal relief.304 Yet, section 510 is equally problematic under the make-whole
theory, which addresses only fiduciary breaches not employment decisions. It may
be that section 510 needs its own separate enforcement mechanism by legislation.
To conclude, the Supreme Court should overturn Russell and allow damages
for all fiduciary breaches under section 409(a). Doing so maintains the textual
integrity of section 409(a) and 502(a)(3), which need not be contorted to
accommodate the make-whole theory. Section 502(a)(3) should focus on
restitution, which is substantive—if not historically or procedurally—equitable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite its ancient and far-reaching history, trust law is, in a crucial way,
narrower than the 36-year-old ERISA. A trustee commits to manage trust
property—not her personal resources—for the benefit of the beneficiary. In
contrast, ERISA health and welfare plans often impose “merely personal duties”
on the employer or administrator to pay benefits. Trusts are deals about property,
whereas ERISA plans are deals about benefits.
This difference explains the failure of current ERISA remedies and the makewhole theory. Trust law routinely redresses breaches involving property but not
personal harm suffered by beneficiaries. Russell305 followed this model,
misinterpreting section 409(a) as reaching only asset administration. The makewhole theory purports to expand ERISA remedies, but relies on trust remedies for
investment losses to do so. Because ERISA already redresses investment losses in
section 409(a), the make-whole theory adds nothing to ERISA remedies.
While trust law should guide the growth of ERISA jurisprudence, it will often
fail at answering specific questions.306 Fortunately, the statute itself answers the
most challenging question of ERISA: section 409(a) imposes damages on
breaching fiduciaries that harm employees personally. Rather than expanding
remedies, the trust model of ERISA led to Russell and marked a path of limited
remedies for breaches not involving plan assets. Reading the statute and

302. See, e.g., Secunda, supra note 6, at 167–74 (proposing statutory corrections to ERISA
remedies).
303. ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
304. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d 1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Medill,
supra, note 11, at 836–37 (anticipating that backpay and front pay may no longer be available as
equitable remedy); Dana M. Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 1 (1995) (discussing backpay under ERISA remedies generally).
305. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1984).
306. See Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1646–48 (2010) (noting trust law provides
conflicting answers to whether courts should give deference to plan administrator).
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overturning Russell are ways by which the Court could, and should, get ERISA
remedies back on the right path.

